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BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

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3. Peaceful Co-Existence. The principle of peaceful coexistence is stressed throughout the text, but it is surrounded by many not so peaceful reservations and limitations. Under the heading "Workers Educated in Internationalism", the document alleges:

"War is a constant companion of capitalism"

"As long as imperialism exists there will be soil for wars of aggression"

"U.S. imperialism is the main force of aggression and war"

After the customary attacks on West Germany, the declaration states under the heading "Imperialists Accused of Causing Arms Race":

"The imperialists frustrate all constructive disarmament proposals by the Soviet Union..."

"The U.S. ruling circles have wrecked the Paris meeting of the heads of government"

"The aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed"

Only as though an afterthought, the document adds:

"War is not fatally inevitable"

One might suspect that this language permits the CCP to continue believing war to be inevitable, as long as they are not fatalistic about it. Further, under the heading "Prevention of War Called Pressing Task", the declaration first seems to confirm Moscow's repeated warnings against the dangers of nuclear war:

"The democratic and peace forces today have no task more pressing than that of safeguarding humanity against a global thermo-nuclear disaster. The unprecedented destructive power of modern means of warfare demands that the main actions of the anti-war and peace-loving forces be directed towards preventing wars."

This pseudo-humanitarian approach, however, quickly turns into aggressive Communist maneuvers:

"To fight for peace today means to maintain the greatest vigilance, indefatigably to lay bare the policy of the imperialists, to keep a watchful eye on the intrigues and maneuvers of the warmongers, arouse the righteous indignation of the peoples against those who are heading for war...."

"In the countries where the imperialists have established war bases, it is necessary to step up the struggle for their abolition..."

"The struggle of the peoples against the militarization of their countries should be combined with the struggle against the capitalist monopolies connected with the U.S. imperialists...."

Finally, the document threatens openly:

"But should the imperialist maniacs start war, the peoples will sweep capitalism out of existence and bury it."

This contradicts various recent Soviet statements which admitted that general nuclear war might inflict intolerable damage upon the Communist nations, too.

f. Cold War - No, Intensified Class Struggle - Yes! The paper reiterates the allegation that the "cold war" is a US invention. Under the heading "Socialist Victory Predicted in Peaceful Competition", the declaration proclaims:

"Communists emphatically reject the U.S. doctrine of cold war and brinkmanship, for it is a policy leading to thermonuclear catastrophe."

Throughout the paper, however, there are numerous indications of intensified class struggle, both national and international, whether "peaceful" or violent. Actually, the entire text contains far more "violent" words, such as struggle, revolutionary, etc., than references to "peaceful coexistence". Under the heading "Peace is Described as 'Socialist Ally'", the declaration asserts:

"Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle, as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In conditions of peaceful coexistence, favorable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle...."

After asserting that "the working class and its vanguard -- the Marxist-Leninist party -- seek to achieve the Socialist revolution by peaceful means", the document threatens (under the heading "Class Struggle Stressed as Path to Reform"):

"In the event of the exploiting classes' resorting to violence against people, the possibility of non-peaceful transition to socialism should be borne in mind. Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily."

g. Communist Tactics: The declaration confirms and re-emphasizes at length well-known Communist tactics, such as: United Fronts, especially with labor unions and Socialists; peace propaganda; support of national independence movements. The Chinese have apparently won their point on this latter issue: not only does the declaration specifically acknowledge the impact of China in Africa, Asia and Latin America, but it also accepts the Chinese distrust of the "national bourgeoisie" in the newly independent countries, by stating (under the heading "Basis of Unity Stated for Progressive Forces"):

"As social contradictions grow, the national bourgeoisie inclines more and more to compromising with domestic reaction and imperialism. The people, however, begin to see that the best way to abolish age-long backwardness and to improve their living standard is that of non-capitalist development."

Somewhat new, at least in its choice of certain target countries, is the appeal on behalf of political prisoners, under the heading "Monopolies Accused of Contradictions":

". . . this meeting expresses proletarian solidarity with the courageous sons and daughters of the working class and the fighters for democracy, languishing behind prison bars in the


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U.S.A., Spain, Portugal, Japan, West Germany, Greece, Iran, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Iraq, Argentina, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Union of South Africa, the Sudan and other countries."

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328. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3
Growing Disillusionment in Iraq with Soviet Trade Agreement and Aid

Shortly after the Iraqi coup of July 1958, bilateral trade agreements were signed with various members of the Soviet Bloc, and the Bloc subsequently made further attempts to penetrate Iraqi markets with trade fairs, exhibits, and attractive price offers to potential Iraqi buyers. An agreement for economic aid and technical cooperation was reached between Iraq and the USSR in March 1959. However, within the past year, Iraqis have been manifesting growing dissatisfaction with the outcome of trying largely to substitute Bloc aid in an economy which previously had been largely dependent upon the free world. Criticism has even appeared in nationalist organs of the Baghdad press. Three derogatory articles have already appeared in Al-Hurriyah, and one long editorial in Al-Ahali has had some questioning and rather plaintive "observations to make." Apparent Bloc shortcomings in trade practices of which the Iraqis complain, include: a general inflexibility about specifications and prices regarding exports from Iraq; Iraqi consumer dissatisfaction with some Soviet products (such as automobiles); inadequate spares and maintenance; and dissatisfaction with the apparent Bloc inability to meet desired delivery dates. The economic aid and technical cooperation agreement has come in for even more severe adverse criticism (although the Iraqis themselves as well as the Qasim regime are in part to blame). A major point of complaint is the exchange rate, which was pegged at a value considered to be highly favorable to the Soviets: 11.2 Rubles to the Dinar. For example, the UAR, with a currency unit valued at about 75% of the Dinar, receives 11.5 Rubles. Furthermore, under the original credit of 137.5 million dollars under the agreement of 1959, intended for use in an ambitious program aimed at the economic development of Iraq (beginning with 25 specific, listed projects), not a single factory has been established under the Soviet plan, which included a steel mill, a pharmaceutical plant, an agricultural machinery factory, textile mills, and some other light industrial plants. The Iraqis may remember Soviet actions in the past with their purchases from the UAR of long-staple cotton: USSR sales were made at prices and in places which undercut normal UAR markets. Similar action with Cuban sugar is now being taken by the USSR: for example, 1,500 tons of Cuban sugar was bought by the USSR and shipped in Soviet vessels to Bulgaria and later sold to Jordan at prices well below those prevailing in Jordan. (Do not use in Jordan) For UAR audiences emphasize that the Soviets are responsible for cut-rate cotton marketing practices.

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329. The New Soviet Man Develops Slowly

A basic problem for the Soviet elite is, how is the ordinary man to be led to do what the elite thinks he should? In a democratic society, men work willingly for their own private material and spiritual goals, along the lines accepted in and compatible with such a society. But the followers of Lenin scorn the shibboleths, as they consider them, of the "bourgeoisie," and seek to mobilize humanity for "socialism," actually for the furtherance of their own power status. The difficulties involved in doing this compelled Lenin himself to give ground and introduce the New Economic Program. Stalin adopted a policy of coercion and terror, and his partial successes were attained at terrible cost. Since his death, there has been some back-sliding, in that the need to offer more material incentives to the Soviet people has been partly (though somewhat reluctantly) recognized. But Khrushchev and his lieutenants cannot move too far in this direction without sacrificing their ideology, weakening their own control, and crippling the Seven-Year Plan. The solution they have adopted is to evangelize the Soviet people with the concept of the "New Soviet Man". In January 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a comprehensive resolution "On the Tasks of Party Propaganda in Present-Day Conditions," spelling out how this was to be done. Party propagandists were lectured on the isolation of their activities "from life, from Communist construction," and the persistence of crime and bourgeois ideology was attacked. Although the goals laid down included the development of civic spirit, morality, and "culture", the first and unmistakably the greatest emphasis was on work: the resolution stated: "The leading place in all ideological work must be given to the struggle for strict realization of the principle 'he who does not work does not eat,' against persons who shun participation in socially useful work, and for inculcating a Communist attitude and developing moral incentives to work." Actually, Khrushchev is only re-emphasizing an old Stalinist concept. Soviet writers and educators have been preaching on the New Man since at least the start of the first Five Year Plan, and in the '30's the idea was popularized in the Stakhanovite Movement, in novels, motion pictures, stage plays and other expressions of "socialist realism."

After almost a year on the "Tasks," the Party appears to be less than satisfied with the results. At the end of September, Party Life, magazine for all CPSU activists, in its lead editorial, charged that "there are still such ugly manifestations among our people as embezzlement of state property, speculation, bribery, overstaffing of subsidiary administrative functions, and the turning of collective gardens into a source of personal profit." On 7 September a lead editorial in Kommunist Tadzhikistana pointed out that, though there had been much talk at party meetings in local educational institutions, "violations of the norms of Communist morals" were continuing. Most significant, the September issue of the theoretical journal Kommunist prominently printed an article which, after claiming progress, went on to say, "The fact however must be faced that, in the implementation of the great program of ideological work set forth in the CPSU CC resolution, only the first steps have as yet been taken. The organization and content of propaganda still show defects and are, in many respects, lagging behind the demands of real life." It is up to the party organizations to manipulate and remold the people, since "of one thing there can be no doubt: the formation of the minds of men in the conditions under which we live is not a spontaneous process."

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personalities and party organizations are singled out for censure or praise, and there is a strong hint that they will be judged by the production results in their areas. The article does not admit failure, of course, and some limited results have probably been obtained. But this Communist "revivalism" seems as unlikely as ever to solve the problem of making people work.

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The Hungarian people, who in 1956 revolted against nine years of despotism and subservience to Moscow, did not succeed in their immediate objective of ridding themselves of their Communist oppressors; however, they did succeed in calling the attention of the entire world, Communist and Free, to certain truths: that communism has alienated and disaffected not only the peasant but also the very working class it claimed to represent; that even the most pervasive and ruthless totalitarian regime can be destroyed from within (immediately or gradually); that there is no such thing as a monolithic Communist world - there are Hungarian Communists and Polish Communists and Bulgarian Communists but no homogeneous Communist society. Thus, it was the destiny of the Hungarian people, by their courage and their suffering, to explode for once and for all time the myth of the invulnerability of the Communist police state. Today, despite their bitter disillusionment, the Hungarian worker and peasant know what they can achieve through their own efforts and also the cost of such achievements. The other Communist countries know it too.

In order to reassert Communist Party leadership following the Revolt (and in accordance with his views of Communist development, which are considerably more moderate than those of his monstrous predecessor, Matyas Rakosi), Janos Kadar has attempted to avoid the excesses of the Rakosi era. His concessions include: a) improvement in the standard of living; b) curtailment of the more blatant excesses of the secret police; c) a stricter observance of "socialist legality" and the provisions of the Hungarian constitution; d) more tolerance toward religion and the arts; e) expanded contacts with the West; f) reduction or abolition of the more obvious forms of Russification. Of course, these changes affect only the more intolerable transgressions. Of those arrested for participating in the Revolt, several thousand remain in prison despite partial amnesties.

While no one has been publicly charged or prosecuted for political crimes in 1960 -- the last show trial was that of journalist Sandor Fekete and psychiatrist Ferenc Merei and colleagues in 1959 - recently there have been rumors of retrials of some prominent revolutionary leaders.

Internationally, the Hungarian regime has attempted to outlive the particularly unsavory reputation produced by its activities during and after the 1956 Revolt and to regain at least the amount of acceptance and recognition afforded other East European regimes. The West, on the other hand, by continually reminding the world of the brutality and vindictiveness of the Hungarian regime, has striven to deny them such recognition. In this battle, time is obviously on the side of the Hungarian regime and, barring any new outbreaks or the need to use excessive coercion, it is likely that Kadar will make progress in convincing the neutral and certain Western countries that there has been a return to pre-Revolt normalcy in Hungary.

In the economy, Kadar's first task has been to rebuild Hungarian industry following the setbacks it suffered during the Revolt. Thanks to the substantial aid received from the Soviet Union and from other Satellites, this was largely accomplished by 1958. Although the economic goals set immediately after 1956 were modest, in 1959 the regime attempted once more to accelerate its industrial program. Despite all its efforts, disinterest and inefficiency have remained rampant.

As is the case throughout the bloc, the agricultural problems in Hungary remain unsolved. In 1958 and 1959, in an attempt to make up for the large-scale dissolution of collectives during the Revolt, the regime renewed its collectivization drive and increased the total collectivized and state sector to over three quarters of the total arable land. Then, in order to mollify the peasantry which had been aroused by these drives, the regime offered cash payments, payments in kind, bonuses, special subsidies for livestock breeding and grape growing, and extended reasonably liberal credit terms for construction and purchases of machinery, stock, seeds and fertilizers. It has invested 17 billion forints in agriculture, 40 percent more than was allocated in the draft Three-Year Plan for 1958-60. As a result of these concessions, many of the peasants have demanded an eight-hour day, better medical care, paid annual vacations and other benefits enjoyed by their industrial brothers. During November, the Hungarian press showed increasing concern over the lags in agriculture. Fall sowing of grain was reported to be 10 percent less than in 1959, and 35 percent of the corn area and 22 percent of the sugar beet area remained unharvested; there are rumors of an impending food shortage. These problems reflect a lack of organizational control over the collectives as well as the perennial passive resistance of the peasant to collectivized farming. Although the indications were that the collectivization of Hungarian agriculture would be deferred until 1962 - 63, on 24 November the regime outlined a new agricultural plan which apparently presages the completion of agricultural collectivization during this winter. Such a decision will further complicate the regime's organizational and supply problems and increase the bitterness and resistance of the peasant.

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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE RUMANIAN
WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS--BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960

The background of the dispute (1957-1960)

1. The present dispute between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) has its origins in differences which date back at least three years--that is, to the summer of 1957. On the Chinese side, antecedent resentments may date as far back as the formative period of the CPC in the twenties, when Stalin's policy of alliance with the Kuomintang drove the CPC to disaster, as well as to the war and early post-war period, when Soviet support for the Chinese Communist cause was minimal and did not inhibit the stripping of Manchuria. There is clearly no single cause for the current dispute. Rather, it would appear, an accumulation of Chinese policies and actions increasingly displeased and challenged Khrushchev and, presumably, a majority of the Soviet leadership. In the field of domestic policy, it is now known that Mao's "Let a hundred flowers bloom" program aroused Soviet doubts about its usefulness. The program for the "great leap forward" beginning in early 1958 and the communes program, adopted by the CPC in May 1958, were readily recognizable as a considerable irritant in Sino-Soviet relations by the silent treatment which they received in the Soviet Union.

2. Disagreement over foreign policy manifested itself in August 1958 when Khrushchev, after four days of discussion with Mao Tse-tung, publicly rejected, on 5 August, Western proposals for a summit meeting within the U. N. Security Council on the crisis in the Middle East--proposals which he had accepted in July. Nevertheless, on 23 August the Chinese began shelling of the off-shore islands. On 23 May 1958 the Commander of the Chinese Air Force predicted that China would make atomic bombs "in the not too distant future" and the Chinese press ceased to refer to Khrushchev's earlier plan for an atom-free zone in Asia. Khrushchev revived his concept of an atom-free zone for "the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin" at the 21st COSU Congress in February 1959. Chinese reactions were not enthusiastic, and, from April 1959 on, reference to the plan disappeared altogether. In the light of these and other indications, it can be fairly assumed that Soviet unwillingness to deliver atomic weapons to Chinese control had become a serious issue. It is now known that the Soviets cited as the reason for their reluctance of their apprehension over Chinese policies and pronouncement in the external field which were in conflict with Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" tactics, which affirmed that global or limited war need not be avoided, and which objected to Khrushchev's aid programs for "bourgeois" regimes in under-developed countries on the grounds that they would delay revolution. Chinese objections to peaceful coexistence tactics manifested themselves after 1957 in the deliberations of the International Communist Front organizations, especially within the World Peace Council and the International Union of Students--two organizations which were most directly and intensely engaged in building their appeal on the unity campaign so typical of the peaceful coexistence period. They desired to involve bourgeois and nationalist groups in mass action and therefore advocated informal conversations, negotiations, and concessions to such groups. The Chinese refused to "sit around the table" with them except in formal meeting of designated representatives, and resisted Soviet efforts to broaden the scope of concessions on program and organization questions. Chinese resistance was particularly manifest after the Soviet decision of June 1959 concerning Khrushchev visit to the United States.

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3. In August 1959, the Chinese overran the Indian border post at Longju and reopened the border dispute with India, after eight years of quiet. The Soviet position on this dispute significantly failed to give full endorsement to the Chinese claims, although earlier Chinese repressive actions in Tibet had been promptly supported as just and as an "internal affair." Khrushchev, as was known later, did not interpret the reopening of the dispute as a mere attempt to register opposition to his trip to the United States, but as an un-Marxist blunder which needlessly undermined Indian neutralist attitudes and potential value in the peace and disarmament campaign and impaired the appeal of CP India. When Khrushchev visited Peiping, after his trip to the United States, for the October anniversary celebrations in 1959, the Sino-Indian dispute was one topic of discussion and it is virtually certain that Khrushchev presented his views on improving USSR-U.S. relations. Sino-Soviet discussions were unsatisfactory, however, and no communiqué was published. According to three widely separated and reliable sources, in October 1959 the CPSU sent a letter to at least the bloc parties, holding fast to Khrushchev's views on USSR-U.S. relations. In November 1959, V. Ilyichev, Chief of the Agitprop Department of the CPSU, published an article in Problems of Peace and Socialism that justified the policy of peaceful coexistence as "class struggle on the international plane" and significantly noted Lenin's criticism of "Left Communists." It is known that the Chinese have since been accused of criticizing the November 1959 joint program of the European parties, which is clearly based upon the same premises as the article. In December 1959, Khrushchev warned the Chinese in stating at the Hungarian Party Congress that "we must all synchronize our watches."

4. In January 1960, the Chinese positions hardened. At the Rome meeting of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council in January 1960 it transpired that the Chinese had charged the USSR with seeking to isolate China in the interest of achieving a *modus vivendi* with the U.S. A reliable source states that the USSR in January 1960 informally broached to the Chinese the idea that the Sino-Soviet differences required discussion, only to be told by the Chinese that the differences were between the parties and should not be mentioned. The CPC appears to have reached during January important decisions which had a major effect on the dispute. On 21 January the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a resolution concerning disarmament which specified that China would be bound only by treaties it takes part in framing; and in February 1960, at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries, the Chinese observers, K'ang Sheng, incorporated the statement in his speech, broadening it to include "all international agreements." The contrast between the descriptions of the world situation K'ang Sheng's speech and those given by the European bloc speakers was striking.

5. It is at this point that the 1957 Moscow declaration first began to be quoted to support the conflicting positions, when the People's Daily of 6 February 1960 asserted that "the development of the international situation has borne out the correctness of the declaration." It appears likely, therefore, that the Chinese decided in late January to take the initiative in broadening the debate. But also on 6 February a verbal message from the Central Committee of the CPSU asking the CPC to attend a meeting to discuss outstanding problems was reportedly delivered in Peiping.

6. In mid-April 1960 the Chinese took advantage of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth to make their most serious public attack on the theoretical innovations developed by the CPSU at and after the 20th Party Congress in January 1956. Using oblique but unmistakable arguments, the Chinese challenged the premises underlying Soviet foreign policy and by implication disparaged Khrushchev's stature as a Communist theorist. The Chinese attack comprised three major statements: two articles in the party's theoretical monthly Red Flag (issues no. 7 and 8, 1 and 16 April), the first entitled "On Imperialism as the Source of War in Modern Times" and the second entitled "Long Live Leninism," as well as an editorial on 22 April in the authoritative newspaper, the People's Daily.

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7. The Soviets replied in the speech delivered in Moscow on 22 April by Otto Kuusinen of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretariat. A very strong defense of current Soviet foreign policy and of the general lines endorsed at the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses, his speech confined its critical comments to general statements condemning "dogmatic positions as backward positions." On the same day a Chinese Politburo alternate, Lu Ting-i, gave a speech in Peiping which incorporated many of the arguments of the "Long Live Leninism" article. The divergences between the two speeches were so great that when one Communist party seriously affected by the dispute, the Indian party, published both speeches side by side in the 8 May issue of its newspaper New Age, without comments, its action aroused considerable comment and created confusion among party members.

8. The Chinese then began to carry their case to the other parties. "Long Live Leninism," the Lu Ting-i speech, and the People's Daily editorial of 22 April were translated and published in the widely circulated English language Peking Review of 26 April. At the same time, the first edition of a book containing the three articles was produced by the Foreign Languages Press in Peiping in many languages for distribution abroad. Two further editions of this book were produced, one in May and the other, after the Panchayat confrontations, in August. The book is known to exist in English, Spanish, French, the Eastern European languages (including Russian), and Vietnamese. It has been distributed in India and in certain countries at least of Latin America and Western Europe. It appears that the Chinese later attempted to circulate the articles in the USSR in one of their two Russian language publications, Druzhba, an action which the Soviets protested. The magazine was in fact suspended from circulation in the USSR after the publication of the June issue. It is known that there were earlier instances of Soviet refusals to circulate Chinese doctrinal writings in the USSR.

9. After the Kuusinen rebuttal of Chinese charges, the CPSU took advantage of the 40th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's book Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder (10 June 1960) to carry the public ideological debate with the Chinese to new heights, including the use of the charge of "deviation." Two Soviet articles published on 10 June, one by D. Shevlyagin in the newspaper Soviet Russia and one by N. Matkovsky in the party newspaper Pravda, expressed this criticism by attacking "contemporary left-wing deviationism" in terms which referred to the positions held by the Chinese party. Both articles highlighted the significance of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957. Matkovsky characterized it as a "programmatic document of the international Communist movement," and as a validation of the general line expressed by the CPSU. Shevlyagin, on the other hand, referred particularly to the declaration as authorizing and requiring a struggle against "leftist opportunism" as well as against "rightist opportunism" such as that of the Yugoslavs. In discussing manifestations of left opportunism he made the significant point that "not only groups of Communists but the leadership of individual parties have veered into leftist deviationism." Neither of the articles explicitly identified the Chinese as the target of criticism, but their relevance to the dispute was unmistakable.

10. The timing of this intensification of the Soviet attack on the Chinese views coincides with a CPSU letter on the Summit Conference which was circulated shortly after Khrushchev's return home following the collapse of the conference, to the Communist parties of the bloc and some others. Although the text of this letter is not available, it seems likely to have been unacceptable to the Chinese, who emphasized from mid-May on that the course of events before and at Paris proved the validity of the Chinese arguments concerning imperialism and the illusory and fruitless character of negotiation. Perhaps the worst offense of the Chinese, in Soviet eyes, was their argument that the only value of Communist participation in such peace negotiations was the purely tactical advantage that came out of their eventual exposure of the true character and intentions of the enemy. This observation was precisely the kind of statement which the CPSU was most eager to avert.

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11. The CPSU decided at this time to send a sharp letter of criticism to the CPC. CPSU letters calling for a conference were reportedly sent to the Chinese on 2 June and on 7 June, and it appears likely that the letter of 2 June was the "sharp" one. It is also worth noting that the CPC leaders went into closed conference in Shanghai on 8 June, a move which may well have been promoted by the receipt of the two CPSU letters. They were in fact still meeting when the Chinese delegation left for the Bucharest party congress.

12. The Chinese too made a major move in the now rapidly developing dispute. They did this in early June at the XIth General Council meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peiping. On 2 June they presented an ultimatum of the official WFTU report to the chief Soviet representative, who rejected it. The Chinese claimed that the report contained objectionable features, including attacks on the communes. At this meeting, which opened on 5 June after a five-day delay, in the presence of both WFTU affiliates and representatives of some twenty-five unaffiliated national trade union federations, the leading Chinese figures Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Liu Ning-i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Liu Chang-sheng publicized the Chinese views on the peace struggle, and threat of imperialism, and the "illusions" aroused by the campaigns for peaceful coexistence and by programs for giving substantial economic aid to bourgeois-led underdeveloped countries. Using a tactic they had employed earlier in April, the Chinese leaders accompanied those criticisms with fulsome expressions of approval of the Soviet posture towards the U.S. at the time of the collapse of the Summit Conference. This approval of the Soviet actions was accompanied by expressions of solidarity with the USSR in its stand against U.S. acts of aggression. It was learned that the CPSU was particularly stung by the speeches of Liu Ning-yi and Liu Chang-sheng.

13. When the Chinese convened a private meeting of Communist party members among the delegates to hear a statement of the Chinese criticisms of CPSU doctrines, representatives of the CPSU promptly opposed the continuation of the talks and made the ominous charge that the Chinese action was violation of the authority of the Moscow declaration paralleled the similar appeal in the Shevlyagin article published in Moscow, and the charge has since figured prominently in the CPSU's presentation of its case. According to creditable reports, during the WFTU session Teng Hsiao-p'ing, general secretary of the CPC, accused the CPSU in turn of abandoning the Moscow declaration.

14. Soviet representatives in Peiping not only criticized the Chinese actions in personal discussions with foreign Communist representatives but took concrete steps to enlist the support of other CP's against the Chinese.

15. When a group of European and African delegates to the WFTU meeting arrived in Moscow on 13 June, a number of CPSU officials conferred with them. The Soviets informed them of the interpretation of the CPSU placed on recent Chinese actions at Peiping. According to a statement broadcast while the Bucharest congress was in session, representatives of the French and Spanish Communist parties held a meeting on 14 and 15 June, at which they reaffirmed their adherence to the 12 Party Declaration. Because the leadership of both these parties was represented in the group of WFTU delegates in Moscow at this time, it appears possible that the meeting in question took place there and that the reaffirmation was a reaction to the Peiping events.

16. In contrast to these cryptic endorsements of the Moscow declaration, on 19 June 1960 a statement by Agoatino Novella, a leading Italian Communist and president of the WFTU, was published in the Italian Party newspaper Unita. In this statement, which was also broadcast in Italian from Czechoslovakia on 20 June, Novella described the Chinese criticism of the resolutions proposed at the WFTU Council meeting in Peiping and, like the 10 June Soviet articles,

characterized the Chinese views as "deviations." So far as can be determined, this was the first instance in which a Free World Communist party publicized this charge against the Chinese. The appearance of the statement coincided with the opening of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party in Bucharest, where the next phase of the dispute developed.

The Bucharest debates (20-27 June 1960)

17. The Chinese determination to press at Bucharest for Soviet adoption of a militant line is suggested by an article in the 16 June issue of Red Flag, which, in an obvious reference to the CPSU's earlier justification of its views on peace and peaceful coexistence, observed that "one cannot separate oneself from the revisionists merely by stating that the forces of socialism predominate over the forces of imperialism." The Chinese delegation to the congress of the Rumanian Workers Party stopped in Moscow for an exchange of views on 17 June. It presented a letter from the CPC which limited its powers to agreeing on a date for a party conference to discuss Sino-Soviet differences and exchanging views, without, however, adopting any formal resolution. The CPSU representatives were not successful in obtaining an admission from the Chinese delegation of the errors of the CPC. The Chinese, however, expressed a willingness to correct their positions if in an exchange of views with the delegates at Bucharest a majority should prove them wrong. The CPSU, justifying its action by invoking the November 1957 Peace Manifesto (not the 12 Party Declaration adopted at the same time), insisted that the views of all the Communist parties should eventually be ascertained before attempting a meeting to reach a final solution. In this context, the Bucharest session should presumably have involved nothing but an exchange of views. The Chinese claimed that at this meeting in Moscow the CPSU had first made the proposal that other parties be brought into the debate, but had wished to confine the group to delegates from the bloc parties only. The Chinese said that they had rejected this proposal. It would appear, then, that the Chinese adherence to their instruction forced the Soviets' hand.

18. Although there are reports that the CPSU intended by the end of May to attack the Chinese at Bucharest, the Soviet decision to make a major effort there to enlist the support of other parties appears to have been reached as a result of the Chinese stand on 17 June. Virtually none of the major Free World parties sent top-level delegates to the congress. The fact that Khrushchev was to lead the Soviet delegation was announced only on June 18, the day of his departure. All the European satellites delegations except Albania were led by persons of national stature equal to that of Khrushchev, but the late arrival of Gomulka of Poland and the early departure of Novotny of Czechoslovakia suggest that this top-level representation was organized on short notice. The leader of the Chinese delegation Peng Chen, was clearly outranked by this group. Fifty parties were represented at the congress. Twenty-five of the thirty-five non-bloc fraternal delegations identified as present were composed of second and third echelon party leaders and none of the more significant Free World parties, except Chile and Syria, were represented by their leaders.

19. The Soviet delegation to Bucharest included B. Ponomarev and Y. A. Andropov, the heads of the two Central Committee sections for relations with the non-bloc parties and bloc parties, respectively. During the first days of the congress they and their colleagues concentrated on briefing fraternal delegates. It is known that groups of delegates were called together separately and briefed from a long letter which the CPSU intended to issue to all parties. The letter had apparently been either completed or revised at the last moment, for it contained the Soviet account of the Moscow exchanges of 17 June and explained the Soviet view of how the inter-party discussion should be handled. The inclusion of Wu Hsu-chuan, the deputy director of the CPC's International Liaison Department, one of the four Chinese delegates suggests that the Chinese too planned to exploit their supporters and acquaintances among the delegates.

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20. The reporting on the sequence of events at Bucharest concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute is in some respects contradictory. The following probable chronology, however, emerges from an analysis of the available information.

a. On 21 June the Rumanian party congress began its open sessions. N. S. Khrushchev, in his first public speech to the congress, presented the essentials of the Soviet line and criticized "mechanical repeaters of what Lenin said on imperialism," called such persons "children," and attacked "those who do not understand that war is, under present circumstances, not inevitable." Other public speeches by Rumanians and fraternal delegates, including the Chinese, P'eng Chen, occupied most of the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd.

b. On 22 June P'eng Chen spoke publicly in the morning. He included in his remarks a characterization of recent U. S. actions as a "peace fraud," and he warned that "imperialism can never be trusted." Referring on a number of points to the 12 Party Declaration, he emphasized the doctrinal statements previously highlighted in the Chinese criticisms of the Soviet line. He praised the Cuban and Algerian struggles and said that war could be averted and peace preserved by aiding liberation movements and revolutionary struggles. He also called for Communist unity and the "broadest possible anti-imperialist united front with this unity at its core." He further charged, as his party had done earlier, that the imperialists were using modern revisionists (Lito) to disrupt Communist unity, and he called for a struggle to the end against modern revisionism. He made no mention of "peaceful coexistence," an omission for which he was later upbraided by Khrushchev. It was on this day that the CPSU began caucusing with the fraternal delegates.

21. Three inter-party meetings dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute appear to have been held. The first occurred on 24 June, when the Soviet bloc representatives met all day to draft a communique. No information is available on this meeting beyond a statement that the first draft of the communique was presented by the Soviet representative and that the Chinese felt obliged to refer the final to the Central Committee in Peking for possible amendment. The move to produce a communique appears, in the light of the CPC instructions to its delegation, to have been a surprise pressure move by the CPSU. The Chinese delegates were obviously faced with a dilemma, but succumbing to pressure, they did sign the communique on the 24th.

22. On 25 June, after the conclusion of the congress at mid-day, a closed meeting of about 150 delegates from about 50 parties was convened. This second meeting, a full-scale debate, was opened by the first secretary of the Rumanian party, Gheorghiu-Dej, who read the draft communique. A number of other delegates then spoke, including, at least, representatives of East Germany, the UK, France, and Italy. In fact, according to one source, a large number of delegates spoke before the Chinese representatives took the floor. The Soviet caucusing and briefings had had some effect, for most of the speakers are reported to have adhered in general to the Soviet line of argument. By not speaking early in the debate, the Soviet representative, Pospelov, resorted to an old Soviet tactic which permitted the CPSU to have the last word and to appear as an objective mediator rather than merely as one more partisan participant in a debate. When the Chinese representative finally spoke, he attacked the line taken by most of the preceding speakers, charging that it was slanderous and one-sided. He also criticized Soviet attitudes toward certain Chinese domestic policies and, specifically, that the reports prepared for the WFTU Peking meeting had contained attacks against the communes and great-leap forward programs. (See note.) He denied that the Chinese had dragged their feet on Soviet peace policies. He also insisted that the Chinese had supported peaceful coexistence, noting in particular their role in the 1955 Bandung conference. The Chinese representative also stated that China would stand on the Moscow declaration of 1957, supported the idea that a reappraisal of the international situation was necessary, and endorsed a proposal

that the reappraisal should be carried out on a multiparty basis. Pospelov too endorsed this proposal. This Chinese reaction appears to have been mainly defensive; what new facts the Chinese delegate brought forward were apparently selected to prove that the Soviet case was a biased and an incomplete presentation.

(Note. This Chinese charge is particularly interesting because the two main WFTU reports presented at Peiping, by Marcel Bras and Ibrahim Zakaria, did not criticize these Chinese policies. In fact, the Bras report contained two laudatory references to the communes. It is known, however, that just before the delayed opening of the Peiping meeting, the Chinese informed the head of the Soviet delegation that the treatment of the peace and disarmament themes in the draft WFTU reports was unacceptable and would be openly attacked if the drafts were not amended before presentation. It is also known that these sections were not amended to meet Chinese demands--in fact, a number of amendments actually made in the final report strengthened the WFTU's support for the Soviet peace line. At least one amendment, dealing with the question of Free World economic trade and aid with underdeveloped countries, was, in fact, of such a nature as to be particularly unpalatable to the Chinese. It seems likely then that the Chinese charges referred to the original draft of the WFTU report prepared by Louis Saillant. The offending language probably was edited out, at Soviet insistence, before Bras actually delivered the report to the council.)

23. Delegates at this second meeting received a number of papers, including an 80-plus page Chinese translation of a CPSU document. This document appears to be a critical factor in the further development of the dispute. It was a sharp, wide-ranging, and bitterly critical summary of Soviet criticisms of the CPC. It embodied criticisms of Chinese foreign policy toward India and Algeria, as well as charges that Chinese actions were destroying "bourgeois" confidence in Communist desires for peace and arousing Afro-Asian suspicions of international Communism. In addition, the Soviet letter criticized Chinese nationalism and Chinese refusal to cooperate fully with the USSR in military matters. Presentation of the document by the Chinese was clearly a part of their effort to set the record straight and undoubtedly disrupted the Soviet tactical plans for the meeting. Such a significant decision must necessarily have been made by the CPC Central Committee, probably during its early June meeting, and suggests that the CPC's attitude toward the Bucharest meeting was predicated, at least to some extent, on the use of this tactic. There is some question whether Khrushchev was present at this first day of debate. It was reported that he was present, but there is no evidence that he participated in the discussion.

24. On 26 June came the final meeting, another closed session that was attended by those present on the preceding day. It was at this second installment of the debate that Khrushchev personally presented his general indictment of the Chinese and provoked a heated exchange with P'eng Chen. The Khrushchev speech opened the proceedings. It was a long one and involved direct attacks on Mao Tse-tung, comparing him to Stalin as "always thinking in his own terms" and "formulating theories without coming into contact with the events of the modern world." It appears that Khrushchev's speech was arranged at short notice, and was at least partly extemporaneous, with Khrushchev injecting facts, anecdotes, and direct charges that effectively demolished the attitude of restraint, tact, and adherence to principle which the CPSU had previously tried to maintain in the debate. Speaking angrily, with violent gestures, he described the CPC doctrines as ultra-leftist, as dogmatic, and, finally, as left revisionist. He said the Chinese did not understand the nature of modern war, and rejected Chinese protests over the fact that the USSR had failed to support China in her border dispute with India, characterizing the dispute as a conflict of purely national interests in which the interests of world Communism were not involved. There is reason to suspect that his attack also included charges directed against some elements of other Communist parties of complicity with the Chinese. He attacked P'eng Chen himself for his failure to refer to peaceful coexistence in his public address to the congress on the 22nd. In general he apparently reiterated in stronger and less ambiguous terms virtually all the

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charges embodied in the original CPSU letter to the CPC, and it seems likely that it was in fact built around the argumentation of the draft circular letter of 21 June earlier shown to Free World delegates.

25. P'eng Chen replied in very heated terms. He said he had asked for a discussion to be held on equal terms, and that the CPC respected the CPSU, but refused to be treated paternalistically. Counter-attacking strongly, he accused Khrushchev of organizing the meeting to make an attack on the CPC and Mao Tse-tung and to cover up a Soviet effort to undermine the prestige of the CPC. He defended Mao as more in contact with the modern world than Khrushchev, and more active than ever since he gave up his leadership of the government. Referring to Khrushchev himself in terms reminiscent of the 16 June Red Flag article, he charged that Khrushchev's policy is a policy of revisionism, creating "illusions" about imperialism and underestimating its true nature. Speaking of the abrupt shifts in Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers, he asked the delegates whether "any conclusions can be drawn regarding Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers." He stated finally that the CPC had no trust in Khrushchev's analysis of the world situation and especially his policy toward the imperialists. Refuting Khrushchev's charges that the Chinese did not understand modern war, P'eng said the Chinese had proved in Korea as well as against the Japanese that they have more experience than other peoples of the world. He further registered a protest, saying that he had asked for delay in the issuance of the communique but had been told on 24 June that it had to be signed in the interest of unity. He stated for the benefit of other delegates the instructions under which he was working, and said that if the communique were published without the approval of the CPC's Central Committee corrections might later be required.

26. A number of statements by others were then made in a general discussion. Todor Zhivkov spoke and gave full support to Khrushchev's position; others, while less warm than Zhivkov, were generally pro-Khrushchev in their views. No one spoke against the Soviet position. Khrushchev ended the session by saying that further bilateral discussions between the CPSU and the CPC were necessary.

27. A commission (or committee) was set up at these sessions to prepare for a conference to be held during the next November anniversary celebrations in Moscow, where all parties were to present their views. Divergent reports on the composition of the committee have been received. In general they agree that the committee was to involve about twenty parties and that all the bloc parties were to be represented. Reports state that the parties of Argentina, Cuba, Brazil, Japan, West Germany, Italy, France, and others were also to be represented on the commission. The terms of reference of this commission are not known. The commission has since been called to meet in Moscow at the end of September. A separate CPSU committee has allegedly been set up as well, to prepare a new CPSU document on the dispute. It seems probable that the CPSU is planning to use it in November as the draft letter of 21 June was used at Bucharest, to predetermine the outcome of the conference. According to one source, Khrushchev gave instructions to the delegates at the end of the session that they were to report back to their Central Committees that a plenum should be convened to discuss the doctrinal dispute, with the results of these plenums to be disseminated at all levels of the party. On the basis of other information, however, it appears probable that most parties did not construe his statement as a command, for there were few such programs initiated before the CPSU's plenum of mid-July.

28. The final communique approved by the fraternal delegates was released by TASS in Moscow in 27 June, and it was adopted primarily to conceal the fact that the meeting had failed to accomplish anything. However, the CPSU, particularly Khrushchev, clearly wanted it as a device to exert pressure for prompt resolution of the dispute. A short and virtually mechanical reaffirmation of the validity of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957, its text did not in fact clarify any of the issues in the dispute. This became apparent in a few days with the appearance

of the Soviet and Chinese press statements on the communique. The signatures of the 12 Bloc parties (including the CPC) registered on 24 June, and the unanimous approval given by the fifty parties represented were to prove the only significant feature of the communique.

29. The principal results of the Bucharest meetings appear to be the following. The Chinese succeeded in making known to a large audience of bloc and non-bloc Communist party delegates their strong exceptions to Khrushchev's policies and some of the less "principled" actions taken against them by the CPSU. They may have hoped that their adamant tactics would create fear of an open split and thus force the Soviets to break down or compromise. Their actions left the Soviets and their supporters in other parties little choice but to defend the Soviet position as the supreme authority and policy maker in the international Communist movement and to apply against the Chinese all their influence within the bloc and Free World Communist parties. It would appear that the final Chinese position was one from which they will have to retreat if they desire a settlement. It is premised that this will be the situation with which the Soviets will attempt to confront them in November 1960, when the world Communist leadership meets in Moscow on the occasion of the celebration of the October Revolution.

The CPSU Document of 21 June 1960

30. The CPSU circular of 21 June consisted of some seventy pages. It outlined the history of the dispute in "recent" years (a point which the Chinese were soon to refute). It presented a bill of particulars on instances of Chinese violation of discipline and refuted the Chinese arguments.

31. Soviet views on the background of the dispute. The document stated that, despite a long history of friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and the CPR, the Soviets noted that the Chinese had "recently" begun to take divergent positions on very important questions and that this stand threatened to disrupt good relations and the solidarity of the international movement. Even as early as 1956, the Soviets said, the Chinese had been making known to other CPs their criticisms of Soviet policies.

32. This divergence was manifested in the Chinese articles on the anniversary of Lenin's birth in April, statements within the WFTU and other international organizations, and Chinese statements at variance with the 1957 Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto. The CPSU had made no move against these Chinese statements, considering it necessary to hold a meeting to discuss them.

33. According to the Soviets, Chou En-lai told the Soviet Ambassador to China in January that the problem was essentially a Party matter and that he preferred not to discuss it. Early in February 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU proposed a discussion to resolve the differences. The Chinese refused to attend such a meeting and began publicizing their views.

34. At the time of the meeting of the General Council of the WFTU in Peking in early June, the Chinese revealed to the Soviets their great dissatisfaction with CPSU positions and they also told other Communists of their attitude. Liu Ning-yi told Grishin that the Chinese were very dissatisfied with the position of the WFTU on the question of peace and disarmament. Liu Ning-yi said that "to sit down at the same table with imperialists" meant the "betrayal of all mankind." He warned Grishin that if the report of the WFTU were not changed, the Chinese would criticize the WFTU and expose its "right opportunism."

35. At a session of the General Council, Liu Ning-yi presented views that differed from the Soviet positions; the CPSU document charged. Then, at a supper and meeting to which the Chinese Politburo invited some delegates, Liu Shao-chi said that there were important differences of opinion among the Communist Parties. Teng Hsiao-p'ing then spoke on "War and Peace", accusing the Soviets of errors

in the 20th Congress thesis on "peaceful coexistence" and "throwing overboard" the Moscow Declaration--at the same time, according to the CPSU document, as he himself contradicted the Moscow Declaration. He attacked Soviet efforts to negotiate with the West as a "betrayal" of world Communism. Chou En-lai was going to speak, but the delegates asserted that they would not condone criticism or discussions "behind the backs" of the Communist Parties.

36. The Chinese said that because of the opposition expressed against their attitude, they would not speak in the WFTU sessions; but they did so nevertheless, even in discussion with non-Communist delegates. Then, the Chinese speakers at the WFTU meeting tried to impose the Chinese line on the WFTU and openly to line the WFTU up against the CPSU.

37. In addition, the Soviet document charged, the Chinese were distributing "Long Live Leninism" and other critical articles within the Bloc, without the permission of the other CPs.

38. Within the international fronts the CPSU charged, the Chinese had been taking a separate position which made it difficult to arrive at decisions.

39. As early as 1949, at the conference of Asian trade unions in Peking, the Chinese had proposed "'unfolding bitter struggle in colonial and semi-colonial countries'" and formation of "liberation armies" under Party direction. This had been done without consulting the Parties and had helped the "imperialists" in their fight against the WFTU. The Chinese had later revised this attitude, the document said.

40. In May 1954, the Chinese Central Committee had sent to the CPSU a report of the Communist fraction of the Chinese trade unions which agreed with the WFTU decisions which applied to all countries. This caused trouble between the WFTU and some CPs. "Now", the CPSU document said, "the Chinese talk of WFTU opportunism, and this threatens the unity of its ranks."

41. More recently, within the World Peace Council, the Chinese had refused to vote on key resolutions.

42. At the IUS meeting at Tunis in February 1960, the Chinese had opposed "broader contacts with student organizations in capitalist countries" and had instead emphasized the need for "uncompromising struggle." At a WFDY meeting in March, and at the Afro-Asian conference in April, the Chinese had opposed discussion of disarmament on the ground that the "call for disarmament lulls the popular masses and demobilizes them in the struggle against imperialism."

43. In violation of the principle of correct "fraternal relations" of Communist Parties, the Chinese have criticized Parties "behind their backs." This criticism of the policies of the CPSU "does not contribute to the prestige or unity of the international movement. In particular, the Chinese had disagreed with the November 1959 "Appeal" of seventeen West European CPs and had called this document "opportunist." In this way, the Soviets say, the Chinese have set themselves up as the "judges over the group of most experienced parties," and they did it in the absence of these parties, at a meeting at Peking. In criticizing the CPSU itself, the Chinese CP has not been direct, but has made use of "indirect methods and functionaries."

44. The CPSU charged the Chinese with departing from the Moscow Declaration and "Peace Manifesto" of 1957 on several counts.

1. They had "revised" the characterization of the present "epoch" so as to make it read that this is "an epoch of wars and revolutions".

2. They say that the "Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence", as it is spelled out in the Moscow Declaration, creates "illusions" and that "peaceful coexistence is impossible; it only gratifies the imperialists and enables them to murder the peoples of Asia and Africa with impunity."

3. The Chinese say that the thesis in the Moscow Declaration that "the struggle for peace is the foremost task" of the Communist Parties is "erroneous and anti-Leninist" and that it encourages the "delusion that there can be peace with capitalism."

4. The Chinese reject the Moscow Declaration's thesis on "different 'of transition' " as coming from an "incorrect understanding of imperialism."

5. The Chinese question the thesis of the Moscow Declaration that the 20th CPSU Congress had opened "a new stage" in the international movement, and they want to reopen the question of the "cult of personality." The Chinese had endorsed the CPSU's action regarding the "cult of Stalin", and Mao Tse-tung himself had done so at the 1957 Moscow meetings. The new proposal to reopen the discussion "detracts from important Party tasks, and weakens the struggle against the consequences of the cult of personality" in some other parties, the document declared.

45. It is necessary to discuss the problems of the character of the present "epoch", "war and peace", "coexistence", and "roads to socialism", the CPSU document states, because these problems are not seen clearly within the Communist movement.

46. Character of the present "epoch". The document criticized as one the Chinese characterization of the epoch as one of "imperialism, wars, and revolutions." The Chinese claim that any other attitude is a departure from Lenin's views. The CPSU believes that the Chinese fail to take into account the changes in the correlation of class forces and that they misunderstand and misinterpret Lenin's thesis. The Chinese analysis is incomplete and it conflicts with the Soviet characterization of the "epoch" as one also of "disintegration of imperialism, transition to socialism, and of formation and consolidation of the world system of socialism." Developing further the well-established Soviet concepts in this regard, the document stated that the definition of the character of the epoch has "great fundamental importance", for from this definition are derived different conclusions regarding "strategy and tactics, peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence, war, peace, and disarmament."

47. The Chinese claim that the CPSU has departed from Leninism in appraising the nature of "imperialism," but they are wrong. The document cited statements at the 20th and 21st Congress and by Khrushchev on his return from the U.S. and later, from France, to support the Soviet refutation of the Chinese charges.

48. War and Peace. At one time, the CPSU document said, the Chinese adhered to the Khrushchev thesis on peaceful coexistence. Lately, in the April articles and at the WFTU meeting, the Chinese have departed from this thesis. In Red Flag the Chinese said that only the "imperialist general staff", and not the Communists, could decide whether there would be war or peace, whether to launch local or general war, or whether to intervene abroad. This attitude is based on a wrong analysis of forces. The document reiterated the Soviet argument that "war is not merely an economic phenomenon", but depends upon the correlation of forces, and that the forces of peace may be able to prevent the "imperialists" from resorting to war. The most "decisive" factor is the Communist camp.

49. To take the position that war is inevitable leads to "fatalism", "paralyzes the struggle", and "disarms the people." Events after the 20th Congress confirm the Soviet thesis. By 1965 "even the most rash imperialists will see that war is impossible."

50. At the Moscow conference in 1957 Mao himself said that "Everything reduces itself to gaining fifteen years. Lasting peace will be assured throughout the world." Today, the Chinese are inconsistent. On the one hand, they call imperialism a "paper tiger". On the other hand, they say that the imperialists cannot be restrained. The CPSU, however, says that the imperialists should be neither over or underestimated.

51. According to Chinese articles, whoever defends the thesis of averting war/ is "opposed to wars of liberation". This is false. Coexistence "does not mean renunciation of proletarian class war, or of national liberation, including armed struggle." The contrary is true: class struggle will increase once the threat of war has been eliminated.

52. The Chinese have persisted in their view that "as long as imperialism exists... the succession of people of war and peace will be permanent and inevitable (The document cited Red Flag and People's Daily.) At the WFTU meeting, Liu Chang-sheng said that it was an "illusion" to think that there could be a world without wars and without arms so long as imperialism exists. At a public session of the WFTU, members of the Chinese Central Committee launched a polemic against the Peace Manifesto which had been signed by "all" Parties, including the Chinese.

53. The CPSU document declared that peaceful coexistence means "gaining time" for the "consolidation of the Socialist system and the acceleration of the building of socialism and Communism." The "Communist Parties cannot permit society to be thrown back hundreds of years" and the destruction of "hundreds of millions" of people.

54. It is impossible to accept the arguments of Red Flag: "We need not fear war. Atom bombs are paper tigers /used by the imperialists/ to subjugate people. The losses from war will be compensated by the victory of socialism."

55. The Soviet position, the CPSU document said, is that ten or fifteen years of peace will assure the supremacy of Socialism and it will then be possible to exclude war, "even if capitalism remains in part of the world." (The document cited Lenin in support of this policy.)

56. Coexistence, the Soviets asserted, will encourage centrifugal forces within the "imperialists bloc" and will "sharpen contradictions" within "imperialist countries" and between them.

57. The Chinese say that coexistence means "class peace". This is wrong. The Soviets never included within the concept of coexistence relations between colonies and colonialist countries, between dependent and imperialist countries, or between the proletariat and the exploiters. Coexistence, on the contrary, is a "form of class war" on the international level. It opens up possibilities for solidarity with the masses for the eventual defeat of capitalism. (The document cited the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of the 17 West European CP's).

58. The Chinese say that, in connection with the struggle for national liberation, "the CPSU is flirting with the national bourgeoisie" and "abandoning class positions." This is wrong. The Soviet position on participation of the national bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle is "Leninist".

59. Soviet economic aid to the "liberated countries" is justified by the fact that "objectively" such aid promotes the cause of peace and weakens imperialism. The Chinese say that the policy should be "revised" on the grounds that when the national bourgeoisie gains power it loses its ability to fight imperialism. India, Egypt, and Indonesia were cited and "are themselves becoming imperialists".

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60. The Soviets answered this by saying that it is necessary not to "skip stages in the revolution". To do so can cause "serious damage." It is essential to "look at the correlation of class forces." The "imperialists" try to exploit "splits in the national liberation movements." The Communists must try to increase their "friends" among the neutralists. This used to be the policy of the Chinese, with their slogan of "unity and struggle", but no longer.

61. The CPSU document said that it was necessary to exploit "contradictions in the enemy camp" and cited Lenin's statements on this subject. The Chinese argument that one should "not sit at the table with imperialists" is a denial of this Leninist policy.

62. The Soviets consider it essential not to minimize the military strength of the "imperialists" because to do so would make it impossible to "mobilize the masses against the threat of war."

63. The document denied that coexistence weakens the military ability of the "Socialist camp", and refuted Chinese insinuations at the WFTU meeting that disarmament proposals encouraged "illusions". The current Soviet approach to disarmament is "new". It is based on the belief that the Soviet policy would make it possible to create "broad popular fronts" and mass movements, and that it makes it difficult for "bellicose circles" to intensify the arms race. The Soviet effort to get rid of U.S. overseas bases is a major aim at the disarmament campaign, and events in Japan have shown the effectiveness of Soviet policy. The Chinese concept of a "third way" which was put forward at the WFTU meeting means nothing less than continuation of the cold war and of the arms race, and causes political difficulties for the peace policies of the USSR by substantiating imperialist charges that Communists want war.

64. Different forms of transition to socialism. The CPSU document refuted the Chinese charge that the CPSU had been advocating the idea that the "peaceful way" was the "only way of transition." It cited the 20th Congress thesis on this point and the statement in the 1957 Moscow Declaration. The Chinese apparently no longer agreed with these statements, which they had at one time endorsed, but if so, they should say so frankly.

65. The need for closer unity between the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. The CPSU document said that the Chinese position threatens serious damage to the unity of the socialist camp and that "many" Chinese actions have been "disloyal and uncomradely".

66. Although the Chinese say that the USSR should lead the "camp", behind the back of the CPSU they have attacked the CPSU, through "trade union representatives, representatives of the national liberation movement and other representatives of the Communist parties." This shows a lack of "sincerity" and is a violation of the "principles of proletarian internationalism."

67. The document cited cases when the CPSU had disagreed with the Chinese Party, but had not intervened: the "hundred flowers" program; the Chinese abandonment of the commune program; of the "Leninist principle of material incentive under socialism." In Soviet eyes, "loyalty to Leninism is tested not only by words but by deeds", the document said, and it cited Soviet aid to the Chinese (5 billion rubles in deliveries and 6.6 billion rubles credit.)

68. The document said that it was necessary and possible for the differences between the Chinese and the Soviets to be overcome "without compromising principles." The Chinese must take into account the "interests of the world Communist movement"; dissension can only benefit "imperialism, the common enemy."

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69. On 17 June, CPSU representatives met with CPC delegates enroute to the Rumanian Party Congress. The Soviets told the Chinese that they considered the latter's "views and methods erroneous." The Chinese refused to change their stand, but said that they would be willing to "admit their errors" if a majority at the Bucharest conference "proved" them to be wrong.

70. The CPSU document said that, in view of the fact that the issues in dispute had been defined in the Peace Manifesto of 1957, signed by all Communist Parties, the CPSU considered it necessary to exchange views with representatives of all parties.

71. The document concluded with an expression of confidence that the CPC would "weigh our comradely criticism in a Marxist way and draw the necessary conclusions, bearing in mind the interests of the entire Socialist camp and the international Communist movement, which are inseparable from the interests of the building of Communism in the Chinese Peoples Republic."

Developments after Bucharest

72. In the three months following Bucharest, the dispute continued unresolved, and indeed, there was no serious attempt to resolve it. Each side continued to argue the merits of its respective position; each continued its effort to get support within the world movement. The Soviets sent a series of letters to the Chinese criticizing the Chinese propaganda activities and putting the Chinese on notice that Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during August. The Chinese replied to these letters and, on 10 September produced a comprehensive rebuttal of the charges which the Soviets had made in the circular draft letter of 21 June. The contents of the Chinese letter of 10 September were made known to some foreign Communist leaders, just as the Soviets had done with their 21 June circular. As of mid-September, leading circles throughout the international movement were well aware of the gravity of the dispute and many were disturbed by the prospects of an international meeting, scheduled for 9 November in Moscow, at which they would be called upon to commit themselves.

73. The developments during these three months will be treated chronologically and in summary form.

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74. On 29 June both Pravda and the Peiping People's Daily carried editorials on the Bucharest communique that made it abundantly clear that both Parties remained firm in their divergent views. Neither of the articles criticized the opponent, but the "principles" statements of position were clearly divergent.

75. Pravda falsely claimed that in signing the communique the entire Bloc had endorsed the thesis of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses, as well as the proven validity of both Moscow Declaration and the Peace Manifesto of 1957. The article was clearly intended to create the impression that the CPSU had the full support of the world movement.

76. Peoples Daily disposed of the communique briefly, using it mainly as peg for lengthy presentation of the correctness of the Chinese interpretation of the Moscow Declaration, with emphasis on "revisionism" as the "main danger".

77. In late June, representatives of the French, Italian, and Danish CPs were in Moscow and were presumably briefed, on how to handle the dispute.

(More)

JULY

78. During July the CPSU took action against Chinese propaganda activities in the USSR, arranged to withdraw Soviet technicians from China, reasserted the fundamentals of the Soviet position, and adopted a resolution which formally endorsed Khrushchev's actions at Bucharest while sharply attacking Chinese views.

79. The CPC leadership apparently held a long conference during the month. It is believed that the Chinese decided to withdraw temporarily from open disputation, to concentrate on strengthening domestic controls in order to counter Soviet pressures, and, in preparation for a resumption of open debate, to exert pressures on the international movement.

80. Early in July, the CPSU informed the CPC that, in carrying some offensive editorials, the Chinese Russian-language journal Druzhba had violated a "no-criticism" agreement. The articles were characterized as against Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration. The Soviets told the Chinese that the Soviet publication in Peking was being stopped and, they asked that Druzhba also be stopped.*

81. Kommunist No. 10, signed to the press 11 July 1960, carried an important article by F. Konstantinov and K. Momdzhyan, who proceeded to uphold the CPSU positions and refute the Chinese arguments on the basis of "revolutionary dialectics" and "creative Marxism". "On ly doctrinaires, and not revolutionaries" could fail to understand the significance of peaceful coexistence in the "changed conditions" of today, they said. Those who argue (as the Chinese have) that coexistence "could disarm the peoples ideologically and demobilize them" are guilty of "misleading" some CPs. "They can only drag these parties to the positions of sectarianism and dogmatism". Anyone who acts to create disunity in the Bloc, the authors charged, are "willy or nilly" working against the "success of the struggle for peace and socialism... the sacred duty" of all Communists.

82. On 12 July the Central Committee of the CPSU convened in plenary session; and its final resolution, dated 16 July, went far beyond a mere criticism of left-wing dogmatism. The resolution gave unusually heavy emphasis of the CPSU's approval of the Conduct of the Soviet delegation to Bucharest, and it actually distorted the result of the Bucharest debate to make it appear that it had formally endorsed the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses and that it had included denunciation of "narrow nationalism". For the first time, the Central Committee formally characterized as "deviations" such views such as those held by the Chinese.

83. The strong commitment by the Central Committee to the Khrushchev line at Bucharest reflected new, disturbing developments in Sino-Soviet relations during the two weeks following Bucharest. Military relationships snagged, and the matter of the Soviet technicians was reaching a critical stage.

84. A Soviet military mission dispatched to China after Bucharest to conclude certain defense arrangements reportedly found that the Chinese had abruptly decided that they, and not the Russians, should control the facilities in question. A CPSU foreign section official told a leading Free World Communist in July that problems had arisen from Chinese demands for modern (presumably atomic) weapons.

*In addition to suspending the distribution of Druzhba, the Chinese illustrated periodical Kitai was dropped for at least two issues. It is not known whether or not this was also mentioned in this July issue.

85. Later in July the CPSU wrote the CPC, complaining about the Chinese attitude toward Soviet technicians. According to the CPSU, the Soviets had wanted to withdraw their technicians for work at home some years earlier, on the ground that sufficient numbers of local technicians had been trained. The Chinese had refused. Then, when the Chinese complained about the behavior of some technicians, the Soviets had considered their withdrawal, but the Chinese demurred. Recently, the CPSU letter charged, the Chinese had added to their disrespectful treatment of the technicians by circulating "anti-Marxist" literature, such as "Long Live Leninism" among them in an effort to subvert them.

86. In a letter dated four days later, without waiting for a reply from Peking, the CPSU served notice that all Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during August.

87. Less is known of Chinese activities during the month of July. "Long Live Leninism" was widely distributed abroad in an effort to publicize the Chinese views within the world movement. A theoretical journal (Hsiang River Critic), which had played a key role during the period in the 1920's and 30's when Mao was opposing Soviet influence on Chinese Communism, was revived in the middle of July. Liu Ning-1, leading a delegation to Japan at the end of July, subsequently demonstrated by his actions in Japan the content of the hard Chinese line in foreign policy. The Chinese leadership, apparently in extended conference from 2 July to 22 July, prepared its answers to the CPSU letters, and it seems likely that the Chinese were then in favor of conciliating the Soviets as much as possible without, however, retreating from positions of principle.

88. Relations continued to worsen during August. The month opened with a Chinese reply on the questions of the technicians and publications. Later, the Chinese leadership appears again to have met and probably to have decided to take a harder position against Soviet pressures. In mid-August the Chinese began again to participate in the open disputation. The CPSU continued to publish articles attacking Chinese positions and employed the Bulgarian Party leader Zhivkov, to push pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese theses in the international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism. Late in the month the CPSU was circulating to foreign CPs a revised and strengthened version of the 21 June letter which had been shown to foreign CP delegations at Bucharest.

89. In the Chinese reply to the CPSU letters of July regarding the publications and technicians, the Chinese said that the CPSU publication in Peking had been writing objectionable pieces since 1959. The Chinese pointed out that the publication Amerika was distributed in the USSR and that it publicized the "American way of life" and "imperialism". The Chinese acknowledged that they must bow to Soviet wishes, but requested reconsideration.

90. Concerning the Soviet technicians, the Chinese refuted the CPSU charges. The CPC had only complained about a few technicians, and this had been settled. It was not true that the advice of the technicians had been treated derisively as the CPSU had charged. The technicians themselves had asked for Chinese literature at the very beginning, and it was not unusual that they had attended occasional lectures. The distribution of "Long Live Leninism" was not exceptional: the technicians had not been forced to discuss it.

91. The Chinese said that if the Soviets continued to object to these practices, they could be discussed, but the CPC did strongly object to the unilateral Soviet action. It constituted a violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty. It would damage the Chinese construction program, create difficulties, weaken the Bloc, and encourage the "imperialists".

92. An Orientalists Congress, which had been long and widely-hearalded by the Soviets and at which Sinology had been given high booking, opened in Moscow on 9 August--without the Chinese. Their withdrawal, without explanation, and with lame explanation by the Soviets, was probably intended to demonstrate disapproval of "opportunistic" Soviet efforts to attract participants from the West.

93. Another meeting of the Chinese leadership appears to have been held between 2 and 13 August. No details are available.

94. In mid-August, Problems of Peace and Socialism carried an article by Bulgarian Party chief Todor Zhivkov, who had signally supported Khrushchev at Bucharest. Zhivkov's defense of Khrushchev's peace strategy as both necessary and feasible followed the line previously enunciated by Khrushchev, Gomulka, Novotny, and Togliatti, and indicated that the CPSU was beginning to step up its use of Problems of Peace and Socialism as a weapon in the dispute.

95. Li Fu-Ch'un, Politburo member and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, reopened the Chinese campaign in the overt debate. His 16 August article in Red Flag (like the April "Long Live Leninism" article) was published in English in Peking Review, 23 August. He charged that the "modern revisionists" who had been trying to isolate China since 1958 would only isolate themselves (as the CPC had said privately to the CPSU in late 1959 or early 1960). In mid-month, the deputy director of the CPC's international Liaison department led a strong Chinese delegation for the Cuban Party congress to Habana, where he concentrated on lobbying among foreign delegates to line them up against the "modern revisionists".

96. Also in mid-August, a speech by Li Wei-han asserted that the Chinese were the only correct interpreters of Leninism: "The Mao Tse-tung ideology is Marxism-Leninism in its fullest developed form in the era of socialist revolution by the proletariat." Characteristically, the speech added a second major thesis reminiscent of 1949: "armed struggle is the principal form of waging the revolution." It is of considerable significance that this speech was not published until 24 September, by which time the CPC had definitely decided upon a much more intransigent attitude toward the CPSU.

97. Meanwhile, the CPSU in mid-August was continuing to elaborate its ideological position. Following an important article by Frantsev in Pravda of 7 August against a "rebirth of views similar to those of the left-wing Communists", a leading spokesman for the foreign section of the Party, B.N. Ponomarev, declared in Pravda that peaceful coexistence was "nothing else but a higher form of class struggle." On 16 August, an article by S. Titarenko explicitly singled out Chinese for warning against the dangers of "isolation."

98. Almost coincidentally, on 16 August Li Fu-ch'un wrote in Red Flag about the need for the Chinese to "rely mainly on our own efforts".

99. On 26 August the leading CPSU expert on Communist tactics in under-developed countries, Ye. Zhukov, wrote in Pravda on "Some Questions of the Contemporary National Liberation Movement." This was a sharp rebuttal of Chinese hostility toward "bourgeois nationalists", which "haughty attitude", Zhukov said, constituted "sectarianism of the most dangerous kind."

100. Late in August it appeared that the CPSU had circulated among the Free World CP's a revised and strengthened version of the 21 June circular which had been shown to delegates at Bucharest. The CPSU seems to have told the recipients that they would now have sufficient time to digest the Soviet charges and to reach clear-cut decisions prior to the scheduled meeting in Moscow in November. The letter emphasized that the CPSU intended to seek clarification and to reach a clear agreement with the CPC.

101. Chinese determination to stand firm on its positions, demonstrated by statements in the Chinese press and at the Vietnamese Party Congress, was communicated to the CPSU in the Chinese letter of 10 September. Soviet statements during the first half of the month indicated that Moscow was also not prepared to retreat.

102. On 4 September the Chinese belatedly published the full text of a speech delivered on 22 July to the Chinese Writers Congress. The speech included a direct attack on the concept of "humanism" -- theme in both the domestic and foreign programs of the CPSU.

103. The following day Li Fu-ch'un, who headed the Chinese delegation to the Vietnamese congress, delivered a speech reasserting the correctness of the basic Chinese positions. The response of the leading Soviet delegate N.A. Mukhitdinov on 11 September was a violent attack on the Chinese.

104. The Chinese letter of 10 September 1960. By far the most important development, however, was the 10 September CPC letter to the CPSU, which was outlined by the Chinese for the benefit of foreign CP's in continuation of the Chinese effort to enlist their sympathy. The letter is organized on a pattern similar to that of the 21 June CPSU circular for the purpose of countering each of the charges in that circular.

105. Chinese views on the background of the current dispute. It was not true, as the CPSU had alleged, that the CPC had agreed with the CPSU in the past and had only recently diverged from the CPSU. Actually, the letter stated the differences began at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, when the CPSU wrongfully struck off Stalin's "positive role" without prior discussion with the fraternal parties, and when the CPSU put forward an erroneous theory of "peaceful transition", also without consulting the other CP's. The CPC had registered its objection to these CPSU actions, both in principle and in unilateral way they had been taken.

106. In October 1956, the Chinese letter stated, the CPSU had mobilized armed forces against Poland and the CPC had objected. The CPSU had wanted the fraternal CP's (apparently in a joint meeting) to condemn the Polish Party collectively, but the CPC had objected to this proposal.

107. In the case of the Hungarian uprising, the Chinese had again been obliged to intervene with the Soviets to get them to crush the uprising by force. The Soviets had at one point been determined to withdraw their forces from Hungary.

108. At the 1957 Moscow conference of CP's and CPC had been instrumental in forcing significant revisions in the first draft of the 12 Party Moscow Declaration. The first draft had said nothing about the subject of state power of class struggle, but rather outlined a purely "parliamentary path" for "transition". The CPC had objected, but, in order to "save face" for the CPSU, had eventually agreed that the Declaration should show a link between the formulations contained in the Declaration and the 20th CPSU Congress theses. *

109. At the Moscow conference, Mao had carefully specified that the CPC should "lead" the Bloc. This preeminence carries with it the responsibilities of leadership, the 10 September letter stated, and the CPSU should discuss matters with the other CP's on an equal basis.

110. The CPC letter, in refuting Soviet charges to the contrary, asserted that the CPC had not discussed these differences with other CP's.

* A key symbol of the current dispute has been the consistent Chinese avoidance of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses in their affirmations of the Moscow Declaration.

111. The Chinese declared that the CPSU had gradually deviated from the Moscow Declaration and had gone back to the "wrong" theses of the 20th CPSU Congress. Khrushchev, especially, was guilty of this from September 1959, and of open criticism of the CPC and its leaders. The letter cited numerous examples of the incorrect CPSU attitude: allegations that the Chinese want to maintain the cold war, characterization of the Sino-Indian border dispute as "stupid"; insinuation that Mao had outlived his usefulness; "testing" the West by arms; Khrushchev's friendly characterizations of Eisenhower; talk about war; etc. Kuusinen's Lenin day article, the Chinese claimed, did not even mention the Moscow Declaration--which shows how far the CPSU had departed from it. Even if Khrushchev says that no names have been mentioned in these statements, it is clear to everyone according to the Chinese, who is meant.

112. The CPC letter defended the Chinese actions at the WFTU meeting in Peking in June 1960 and pointed out the inconsistency of the Soviet position: it is correct for the CPSU to attack the CPC in the presence of non-Communists and "imperialist" reporters at Warsaw (i.e., at the CEMA conference) and Bucharest, but wrong for the Chinese to call a meeting of Communists trade unionists at Peking. Furthermore, the CPC letter reveals the main point of the Chinese objection to the Saillant report (concurred in by the Soviets, the letter states) to the WFTU meeting: the report mentioned the free world without quotation marks, whereas communes and the Leap Forward were put in quotation marks. This styling constituted an open criticism of the CPC's policy.

113. According to the 10 September Chinese letter, the CPSU had sent a letter to the CPC on 2 June calling for an international meeting to resolve the differences. The CPC had agreed but had asked for time to prepare itself. Then, on 7 June, the CPSU suggested that there be held at Bucharest a preliminary conference to discuss tactics following the collapse of the Summit. The CPSU assured the CPC that no resolution would be adopted at this meeting. Again, the Chinese agreed. But at Bucharest Khrushchev surprised the Chinese by launching on their positions a full scale attack for which they were not prepared. Instead of an attack on "imperialism", as the CPSU had proposed, the discussion was diverted to a "harmful and disruptive" attack on the CPC. After Bucharest, a press campaign was launched against the Chinese. The CPC letter criticized the CPSU for rashness and said that the latter seemed not to have understood how much this had damaged Soviet prestige as the leader of the camp.

114. Concerning the assessment of the character of the "present epoch", the CPC letter reasserted the correctness of its assessment of the present balance of forces and its interpretation of this shift as meaning "greater opportunities for struggles for Socialism, for national liberation, for peace, to expand and to succeed." Khrushchev's views on the significance of the shift (which Mao recognized as early as 1949) are erroneous. The CPSU and Khrushchev have deviated from the Moscow Declaration in talking about "banishing war for ever", "world without arms and weapons", "export of capital helping the development of colonial people", local wars leading "inevitably to world war", etc. The CPSU, by emphasizing the importance of discussions with imperialist statesmen, promotes the "personality cult." These views harm the "liberation struggle". Khrushchev overestimates the weakening of "imperialism"; and his views are "subjective" and "idealist".

115. Concerning the question of "war and peace", the CPC letter challenged the CPSU positions. The CPSU has turned the slogan "war is not fatalistically inevitable" into "war is fatalistically avoidable". The CPSU not only "hesitates" to support "liberation struggles" but even "opposes" them. Of all the forces for maintaining peace cited in the Moscow Declaration, the strength of the camp is the most important, but the CPSU is weakening the camp by withdrawing technicians. The letter justified Mao's "paper tiger" thesis by quoting Lenin to the effect that "Anglo-French imperialism has feet of clay". The well-known Chinese emphasis on "vigilance" and "struggle" was reiterated, and the

letter argued that not the Chinese but the Soviet argument about the "destruction of mankind" by nuclear war "is to create panic and lead to surrender and black-mail."

116. On the question of "peaceful coexistence", the Chinese letter conceded that negotiating with "imperialists" may be necessary but objected to anything that would "beautify" them. It might also be necessary to compromise, but the Chinese would trust more in the efficacy of "exposing the mass struggles" than in the "good wishes" of the imperialists. The letter held out for what the 21st June CPSU circular had called the "third way": "world war can and must be avoided, but the alternative may not be peaceful coexistence. It may be something like what obtains at present, call it cold war of anything you like." The letter objected to specific Soviet formulations, such as calling peaceful coexistence "the highest form of class struggle" * and saying that the "upsurge of liberation struggles is the result of coexistence". ** It said that Zhivkov had carried this (false) line of reasoning further in saying that "coexistence is the road to socialism." *** The Chinese attitude toward bourgeois nationalists was reaffirmed.

117. On the question of "peaceful transition", the Chinese claimed that the CPSU had taken a "one-sided" view, had sought in the first draft of the Moscow Declaration to "evade" the hard facts of "state power, class struggle, dictatorship, smashing the state machinery" and had been guilty of turning "Leninism into bourgeois humanism". The question of "peaceful transition" must not be confused with the "parliamentary path": "we should have no illusion about the possibilities of bringing about structural changes through Parliament."

118. "Tactics in the International Mass Organizations." The CPC letter defended the Chinese attitude toward the international fronts: they should be "fighting organizations"; they must fight "imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism"; they must "support unequivocally all national liberation struggles" and "democratic struggles inside capitalist countries"; they must be "flexible" and not merely rubber-stamp Bloc policies. But the Soviets were "all along" opposed to support of national liberation struggles by the World Peace Council, and the International Union of Students nearly was "liquidated due to Soviet insistence on the merger of reactionary students' organizations."

119. Concerning Revisionism and Dogmatism, the Chinese letter reaffirmed the Moscow Declaration assertion that "internationally revisionism is the main danger" and rebuked the CPSU for holding that "revisionism has already been smashed". It sought to turn around the Soviet attack on "dogmatism" by pointing out that it was "dogmatic" to attack such "concrete applications" of Marxism as the Communes and Great Leap Forward.

120. With respect to International Solidarity, the 10 September letter returned to the CPC's views on the way the CPSU should conduct itself as the "leader" of the Communist "Camp". The relationship must be on a basis of equality and responsibility. The CPSU violated this principle when it said that "all" the parties at Bucharest supported the Soviets. This assertion was not true, the Chinese said: some CP's had taken different positions. Also, it was

* See reference to the Ilyichev article of November 1959, in para 3 above.

** Possibly, a reference to the Pravda article of 26 August 1960 by Ye. Zhukov, in which such an argument is implicit.

*** An elided excerpt from the article by Zhivkov in Problems of Peace and Socialism, August 1960.

"unfortunate" that the CPSU had raised the dispute to the level of state relations in the matter of the technicians. The letter expressed the Chinese conviction that "Socialist unity is basic, while the differences are temporary." As for the November meeting in Moscow, the Chinese believed that it would be a good thing if there could be an agreement, but they feared that one meeting might not be sufficient. Meanwhile, they would continue to emphasize issues on which agreement existed, while continuing to discuss unresolved differences.

121. Following the issuance of the 10 September CPC letter, the last development to be accounted for in this survey is the publication in mid-September of two Soviet-inspired articles in Problems of Peace and Socialism, and an article in Kommunist. The PPS articles, by Leon Bohr and Jean Dienne, further develop the validity of the Soviet argumentation and present a number of the anti-Chinese charges. Neither writer has been identified. The names may well be pseudonyms and the CPSU's "use of functionaries" to conceal its hand is interesting in view of the fact that it had accused the CPC of using this same device earlier.

122. An article by A. Belyakov and F. Burlatsky in Kommunist No. 13 (10 September 1960) systematically criticized "dogmatic" (Chinese) positions on peaceful coexistence, class struggle and national liberation movements, and the possibility of "peaceful transition." Significantly, the article upheld the "creative approach" of the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of the seventeen West European Communist Parties, which the Chinese had been covertly attacking as "opportunistic."

The Bloc Parties

123. In the first three weeks after Bucharest (i.e., prior to the CPSU plenum), the Soviet effort to get full support for their positions on the part of the other Bloc parties met with mixed success. The CPSU plenum of mid-July stimulated further developments in this direction.

124. By mid-September the following Bloc parties were on record as formally committed to the Soviet side on the issues in dispute: Hungarian (29 June), Bulgarian (13 July), East German (24 July), Rumanian (1 August), North Korean (11 August), Polish (15 September). In addition, Novotny of Czechoslovakia early in July made statements endorsing the CPSU line. His statement and a similar one by Gomulka at that time were sufficiently satisfactory to the CPSU for publication in Pravda (8 July).

125. The Mongolian Party on 4 July and the Albanian Party on the 11th adopted resolutions which clearly failed to satisfy the CPSU, and they were ignored by the Soviet press in a 20 July roundup. The CPSU evidently exerted pressure on these two parties, for on 14 August the Mongolian party publication finally presented a vigorous criticism of "dogmatists" and aligned itself with the CPSU, and on 2 August, Enver Hoxha of Albania spoke in support of the Soviet view on war and the desirability of peaceful coexistence. He did not, however, retreat from the Albanian party's firm insistence that right revisionism remains the main danger to the Communist movement, and in fact the Albanian CP is clearly on the Chinese side in the dispute.

126. The North Vietnamese Party at the outset indicated that it wished to remain neutral in the dispute and has continued to do so despite evidence of Soviet pressure. In private conversation in September, Ho Chi Minh reportedly stated that he was determined to remain neutral. He considered it important that an agreement between Mao and Khrushchev be reached before the November meeting in Moscow, but he feared that neither would give in. On the questions of "transition" and Chinese policy toward India, Ho appeared to support the Chinese views.

127. In addition to the adoption of formal positions on the dispute, "explanatory" programs were observed in some Bloc countries.

128. Following a conference reportedly held at Varna among Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, Czech, and Rumanian representatives in the last week in July, the Bulgarian party leadership discussed the launching of a "mass explanation" within the party in order to explain the issues in dispute, to justify Bulgarian support of the CPSU, and to allay what was described as a feeling of "general tension bordering on panic" in the upper echelons of the Party as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

129. The East German party also launched a briefing campaign at the same time. Lower cadres were briefed on the basis of extracts from the report on the Bucharest conference. An attempt was made to create the impression that the dispute involved practical matters rather than basic policy considerations.

130. In both the Bulgarian and East German parties it seems that Party officials were told to watch out for manifestations of deviations similar to those of the Chinese, and countermeasures against "nationalist" deviations figured in the plans for the anti-Chinese effort in both countries.